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Abstract
This comment addresses the failed codification of Illinois Rule
of Evidence 407 on Subsequent Remedial Measures. This comment
traces the case law leading to the attempted codification in 2011,
which ultimately could not reconcile the differing Illinois
Appellate Court opinions on the issue of the feasibility exception.
This comment argues that the differing opinions resulted from the
courts' various interpretations of the relevant time period of
feasibility of an alternative design. Ultimately, tracing the divisive
Illinois Appellate Court opinion in Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co.,
this comment proposes a balancing test to address each exception
to the Subsequent Remedial Measures rule and the time periods
within the feasibility exception.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Very rarely will the lawyers and the judge in a courtroom agree
that a piece of evidence is relevant yet not admissible.2 Looking at
1

Committee Commentary, ILL. RULES OF EVID., www.illinoiscourts.
gov/SupremeCourt/Evidence/Evidence.htm#commentary (last visited Nov.
16, 2018) (stating “[t]he Committee reserved Rule 407, related to subsequent
remedial measures, because Appellate Court opinions are sufficiently in
conflict concerning a core issue that is now under review by the Supreme
Court”).
2. See M.C. Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, Part III, 5 U. KAN. L. REV. 675,
705-09 (1957) (explaining the general concepts underlying subsequent remedial
measures evidence).
403
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UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:187

civil litigation specifically, this exact scenario occurs when plaintiffs
seek to introduce evidence of subsequent remedial measures. In
these cases, courts must decide whether it is proper for a jury to
hear about what a defendant fixed after an accident occurred.3
To illustrate the issue, picture a plaintiff who files a lawsuit
against a car manufacturer after her husband dies in a rear end
collision.4 The husband’s death was not caused by the collision, but
by a raging fire that developed from a dangerous condition in the
car’s design. As discovery unfolds, evidence emerges that the car
manufacturer knew about the defect and made changes to the
design of the car’s body only after the accident. In this hypothetical
the plaintiff, defendant, and judge will all likely agree that the
knowledge of the defect and the design changes made after the
accident are entirely relevant. Yet, a jury will never hear this
evidence—or so an experienced attorney would think.
This is the web that subsequent remedial measures evidence
weaves into civil litigation. The underlying rules and policies,
however, only tangle this web. In Illinois, the common law
surrounding subsequent remedial measures is currently in
disrepair. Nevertheless, there is still no shortage of these cases. For
example, medical malpractice defense attorneys managed to
introduce evidence of a catheter’s subsequent design changes to
point the finger at the catheter’s manufacturer rather than their
client.5 On the other hand, in a garden-variety negligence case, a
3. See Mark G. Boyko & Ryan G. Vacca, Who Knew? The Admissibility of
Subsequent Remedial Measures When Defendants Are Without Knowledge of the
Injuries, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 653, 655-677 (2007) (discussing how Federal
Rule of Evidence 407 should be applied to defendants who are without
knowledge of the plaintiff’s injury).
4. Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co., 923 N.E.2d 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)
(upholding trial court’s admission of pre- and post-accident designs to show
feasibility of an alternative design); Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co., 955 N.E.2d
1138 (Ill. 2011) (reversing appellate court’s admission of subsequent remedial
design because plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence of
unreasonableness at the time the accident occurred). The issue does not only
present itself in car manufacturer cases. In fact, feasibility of an alternative
design may be used to prove a plaintiff’s case in most products liability cases.
See also Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249, 260 (Ill. 2007) (setting
forth that “under the risk-utility test, a court may take into consideration
numerous factors. In past decisions, this court has held that a plaintiff may
prove a design defect by presenting evidence of ‘the availability and feasibility
of alternate designs at the time of its manufacture, or that the design used did
not conform with the design . . ..’”) (quoting Anderson v. Hyster Co., 385 N.E.2d
690, 692 (Ill. 1979) (allowing expert testimony about unsafe condition when
defendant’s forklift truck clearly did not meet safety standards)). Therefore,
evidence of alternative design and post-accident remedial measures is most
common in a products liability context as reasonableness, feasibility, and
foreseeability are difficult to separate. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 383.
5. McLaughlin v. Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 386 N.E.2d 334
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (finding the admission of subsequent remedial measures not
prejudicial when the manufacturer of the defective catheter was not a defendant
in the case).
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defendant-owner excluded evidence of the owner’s post-accident
step repair.6 Although the evidentiary issues of these two cases
match, their outcomes were opposite.
A well-defined path exists to navigate these disputes in other
jurisdictions, as well as in federal courts.7 In Illinois, however, one
must be prepared to untangle the web. In addition to conflicting
case law, Illinois Rule of Evidence 407: Subsequent Remedial
Measures stands reserved.8 Therefore, Illinois can only rely on this
inconsistent common law to determine the admissibility of
subsequent remedial measures.9 This comment works to dissect the
inconsistencies and propose a new draft of Illinois Rule of Evidence
407.
Part II of this comment discusses the definition of subsequent
remedial measures. More importantly, this section breaks down the
underlying policies and three exceptions to subsequent remedial
measures. Before heading to an in-depth analysis, this section
brings readers up to date with recent developments in Illinois
history, including the failed codification of Rule 407 in 2011.
Part III pinpoints the seminal cases leading up to the failed
codification of Rule 407. This section discusses the shift in court
rulings that led to Jablonski v. Ford Motor Company, the Illinois
appellate court case that resulted in reserving Rule 407. Then, this
section examines Jablonski, and explains how this decision derailed
the previously quasi-consistent court rulings. Finally, this section
details Jablonski’s long-lasting effect on Illinois subsequent
remedial measures law.
Part IV concludes by proposing a three-part balancing test as
a rule to encapsulate the holdings of seminal Illinois cases.

II. BACKGROUND
A subsequent remedial measure is a change, repair, or
precaution the defendant makes after an event or injury has
occurred to prevent it from happening in the future.10 The generally
accepted rule states: “evidence of subsequent remedial measures is
generally inadmissible to show negligence because it would
discourage people from fixing dangerous situations.”11 Like most
6. See e.g., Coshenet v. Holub, 399 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (affirming
trial court’s decision to exclude subsequent repairs when control was
undisputed based on lease terms); Schultz v. Richie, 499 N.E.2d 1069 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986) (deciding when control is undisputed, evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is inadmissible under the control exception).
7. FED. R. EVID. 407 (2011).
8. ILL. R. EVID. 407 (2011).
9. Id.
10. Herzog v. Lexington Twp., 657 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. 1995) (holding
subsequent remedial measures are inadmissible unless defendant makes
exaggerated claims of a safe or adequate condition).
11. Lew R.C. Bricker, State of Illinois Compendium of Law, U.S. LAW
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rules of evidence, a state’s subsequent remedial measures rule is
commonly derived from the Federal Rules of Evidence.12 Federal
Rule of Evidence 407 reads:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures
are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or
harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a
product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or
instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as
proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures,
if controverted, or impeachment.13

Three notable and essential exceptions to the rule currently
exist:14 “the court may admit this evidence for another purpose,
such as impeachment or — if disputed — proving ownership,
control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures.”15 These
exceptions tend to “swallow the rule”16 and create the very problem
Illinois courts currently face.17 Rather than rubber-stamping
subsequent remedial measures as inadmissible with minor
exceptions, it is essential to understand the facets of the three
exceptions and their application in Illinois jurisprudence.

A. The Three Exceptions to Allow Evidence of Subsequent
Remedial Measures
The first exception, control or ownership, is usually triggered
when a defendant disputes responsibility for the condition of a
property.18 Evidence of subsequent remedial measures may be
admitted to prove that the defendant did in fact control or own the
property and is therefore liable for its condition.19 One key part of
the control/ownership exception, however, is that control or

NETWORK
26
(2015), www.uslaw.org/files/Compendiums2015/National/
National%20Compendium_Illinois_2015.pdf.
12. Boyko & Vacca, supra note 3, at 657.
13. FED. R. EVID. 407.
14. Courts have also allowed evidence of a subsequent remedial catheter
design because the manufacturer was not a defendant in the case. McLaughlin,
386 N.E.2d at 335-38. In McLaughlin, plaintiffs argued medical negligence on
the theory of res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 335. As a defense, Defendants introduced
evidence that the catheter itself was defectively designed and, therefore, the
doctor was not the cause of plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 338. The court in McLaughlin
admitted evidence of subsequent remedial design by the catheter manufacturer
to substantiate their defense. Id. at 338-39.
15. FED. R. EVID. 407.
16. Davis v. Int’l Harvester Co., 521 N.E.2d 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
17. Slough, supra note 2 at 709 (stating, “enfeebling exceptions are known
to point up the invalidity of a general rule.”).
18. Herzog, 657 N.E.2d at 932.
19. Id.
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ownership must be disputed.20 Schultz v. Richie illustrates the
necessity of disputed control.21 In Schultz, the plaintiff-police officer
slipped and fell on defendant-homeowner’s icy front porch step,
which caused a career-ending injury.22 Two years after the fall, the
homeowner installed new gutters to divert water accumulation.23
The police officer sought to introduce this evidence, arguing it was
an admissible subsequent remedial measure under the
control/ownership exception because it showed the homeowner had
control over diverting the water.24 The court properly excluded this
evidence, however, as the homeowner conceded he had control of the
property during trial.25 Therefore, since no dispute of control
existed, evidence of a subsequent remedial measure was
inadmissible under the control/ownership exception.26 If, in the
Schultz case for example, the defendant homeowner disputed
control and argued he only rented the home and was not responsible
for gutters,27 then this dispute may potentially admit subsequent
remedial measures evidence.28
The second exception to allow evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is the impeachment exception.29 In Herzog v. Lexington
Township, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that “the principles
necessary for determining when the impeachment exception should
apply have not been clearly articulated.”30 In that case, the injured
party sought to introduce evidence that road signs were erected

20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Schultz, 499 N.E.2d at 1069.
22. Id. at 1069-70.
23. Id. at 1070. This is when the first exception lives up to its
“straightforward” reputation. See Slough, supra note 2, at 708 (suggesting “[an]
[owner] will not make repair upon property which he does not control, nor will
a manufacturer or business promulgate regulations concerning an activity
beyond his control. Therefore, if one repairs a stairway or sidewalk or a
machine, it seems valid to infer the existence of control at the moment of injury
or accident”).
24. Schultz, 499 N.E.2d at 1073.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. This scenario arose six years earlier in Coshenet v. Holub. Coshenet v.
Holub, 399 N.E.2d 1022. In that case, a tenant sued the building owner after
falling down the stairs. Id. at 1023-24. Like Schultz, the plaintiff-tenant in
Coshenet wanted to introduce post-accident fixes under the control exception.
Id. The court did not allow this evidence, however, as control was not disputed
because the written lease specifically required the tenant to make repairs to the
building. Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, like Schultz, no control dispute
meant no subsequent remedial measures evidence.
28. For a case in which building ownership and control is disputed and the
court allows evidence of subsequent remedial measures. See Kipping v. Ill. Dep’t
of Empl. Sec., 52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 211 (1999) (determining evidence of post-injury
remedial measures is admissible when defendant-building owner disputed
control over a slippery entryway).
29. Herzog, 657 N.E.2d at 932-33.
30. Id. at 933.
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after an accident occurred on an unmarked back road.31 There was
evidence that the defendant City erected signs on the back road only
after the accident.32 The injured party argued they should be able
to impeach the defendant City’s witness testimony that the road
was not unsafe at the time of accident.33 The court in Herzog
narrowed the impeachment exception to deter introduction of
evidence under “the guise of impeachment,” and set forth the
exception that this evidence is only allowed for “attempts to make
exaggerated claims.”34 In other words, subsequent remedial
measures are only admissible if a defendant, like the City in Herzog,
testifies that the roadway was in the “safest possible” condition.35
Although Herzog provides the generally accepted stance in Illinois,
the impeachment exception has also been allowed when a party
“opens the door” or elicits a line of questioning on subsequent
remedial measures.36
The third and most important exception to this comment is the
feasibility exception. Feasibility of preventative measures, also
commonly referred to as feasibility of alternative design, is not as
straightforward as the first two exceptions. The feasibility
exception may allow admission of subsequent remedial measures if
a defendant disputes the ability to prevent or lessen the harm of the
accident before it occurs.37 Again, note that feasibility must be
disputed for the exception to apply.38 Courts have clarified that the
standard for the feasibility exception is not “necessary under the
circumstances.”39 Rather, feasible means “capable of being done,
executed or effectuated; capable of being successfully

31. Id. at 928.
32. Id. at 932.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 933. (emphasis added). An interesting twist to the seminal Herzog
v. Lexington Township case is presented in the Herzog dissent. Justice Harrison
notes that the exact roadway against the same township was previously
litigated a couple years prior in Johnson v. O’Neal. Johnson v. O’Neal, 576
N.E.2d 486 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). In that case, the plaintiffs won, and the
defendant township did not appeal. Herzog, 657 N.E.2d at 934-35. (emphasis
added). The dissenter in Herzog argued that if the defendant believed they were
not negligent, they should have appealed the first case too, not just the second
case. Id. The prior litigation not only presents another layer to subsequent
remedial measures evidence, but also likely implicates Supreme Court Rule
404(3)(b).
35. Herzog, 657 N.E.2d at 933.
36. See Van Gelderen v. Hokin, 958 N.E.2d 1029, 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)
(allowing subsequent remedial measures evidence when defendant inaccurately
testified that he did nothing to remedy stairs after injury).
37. MICHAEL A. GRAHAM, GRAHAM’S HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE 340
(2016).
38. Id.
39. Lewis v. Cotton Belt Route-St. Louis Sw. Ry., 576 N.E.2d 918, 929-30
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures when
defendant testified adding a spotter was not feasible).
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accomplished.”40 With this, feasibility arguments often appear in
jurisprudence when plaintiffs argue a defendant was capable of
making a change before the injury and should have made the
change before, rather than after an accident, in order to prevent
injury.
Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp. illustrates the
foundational concepts of this exception.41 In Sutkowski, a stone
crushed a mineworker as he exited a strip mining machine.42 The
decedent’s wife sought to introduce expert testimony to establish
the death could have been prevented if defendants installed the
machine’s protective barrier before, rather than after, the
mineworker’s death.43 The appellate court granted a new trial on
this issue and allowed this testimony because “the [expert] witness
would have testified to design alternatives which could and should
have been installed at the time of manufacture of the machine.”44 In
so holding, the court in Sutkowski formulated the feasibility
exception by stating “if the feasibility of alternative designs may be
shown by the opinions of experts or by the existence of safety devices
. . . we conclude that evidence of a post occurrence change is equally
relevant and material in determining that a design alternative is
feasible.”45 Therefore, Sutkowski opens the proverbial door to
subsequent remedial measures in some ways, as the court mentions
factors such as efficiency, economy, and practicality, but it does not
articulate the feasibility exception.46
These three exceptions range from relatively benign to
completely obscured in Illinois. There are a number of Illinois
appellate court cases on subsequent remedial measures, but no one
well-defined pathway exists to admit or exclude this evidence.47 One
certainty, however, is that navigating these exceptions is key. Often
times, whether subsequent remedial measures evidence is allowed
may come down to clever lawyering and judicial interpretation.48

40. Id. at 930. (citing BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 739 (4th
ed. 1951)).
41. Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 281 N.E.2d 749, 750 (Ill. App. Ct.
1972) (allowing evidence of post-accident changes to prove an alternative design
was feasible and should have been installed at the time the defendant
manufactured the machine).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 750-51.
44. Id. at 751 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 753.
46. Id.
47. Graham, supra note 37, at 338-44.
48. See Slough, supra note 2, at 708 (stating “[o]pportunities for
circumventing the purpose of the rule are legion, an it is quite evident that
admission or exclusion will be judged on the basis of subtle trial maneuvers”).

410
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B. Balancing Admissibility with Relevance and Prejudice
Although a subsequent remedial measure could be admissible
under one of the three exceptions, the evidence may still be
inadmissible using the ever-present Rule 401 versus 403 balancing
test.49 Every piece of potential evidence could be subjected to this
test at trial.50 Furthermore, any ruling on the admission of evidence
is within the court’s discretion.51 The “any tendency” rule implicated
by Federal Rule of Evidence 401 marks one end of the balancing
test.52 The “any tendency” test sets forth that evidence is relevant
when it has “any tendency” to make a fact more likely to exist than
it would have been without that evidence.53 The equivalent in
Illinois is Rule of Evidence 401.54 Unlike the subsequent remedial
measures rule, it mirrors the Federal rule.55
The second part of the balancing test, under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, considers relevant evidence with probative value and
determines if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the
risk of prejudice.56 Again, Illinois’ Rule of Evidence 403 mirrors the
Federal rule.57 Therefore, even if a plaintiff argues that a piece of
subsequent remedial measures evidence is admissible due to a
dispute of control, feasibility, or for impeachment, a court may still
exercise its discretion to exclude that evidence as irrelevant or
prejudicial.58 The topic of relevance and admissibility of subsequent
remedial measures will be largely implicated in the Analysis section
of this comment, as Illinois courts depart greatly from federal courts
with their idea of the relevant time period for remedial measures.59
49. Boyko & Vacca, supra note 3, at 660.
50. Id.
51. ILL. R. EVID. 104(a).
52. FED. R. EVID. 401.
53. Id.
54. ILL. R. EVID. 401.
55. Id.
56. FED. R. EVID. 403.
57. ILL. R. EVID. 403.
58. See e.g., Kwon v. M.T.D. Prods., 673 N.E.2d 408, 410-12 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996) (affirming that evidence of a post-accident safety measure was relevant
and admissible under the feasibility exception). In Kwon, a child was injured
after jumping on a reversing mower. Id. at 410. The child’s father sued the
mower manufacturer alleging numerous unreasonably dangerous conditions.
Id. At trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of a safety feature
implemented after the accident in order to argue infeasibility of an alternate
design. Id. The plaintiff argued the subsequent remedial measures were
irrelevant to the accident, and therefore inadmissible. Id. at 411-12. The court
ultimately decided that the defendant’s evidence helped establish a different
design was not feasible. Id. at 414. In so holding, the appellate court affirmed
the admission of subsequent remedial measures as relevant. Id.
59. Ralph Ruebner & Eugene Goryunov, A Proposal to Amend Rule 407 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence to Conform With the Underlying Relevancy
Rationale for the Rule in Negligence and Strict Liability Actions, 3 SETON HALL
CIR. REV. 435, 455 (2007) (suggesting an amendment to the language of Rule
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C. Public Policies Underlying Exclusion of Subsequent
Remedial Measures
In addition to the principles underlying admissibility, the
public policies used to exclude subsequent remedial measures
cannot be ignored.60 Three underlying policies work to exclude
subsequent remedial measures.61 In Illinois, the three policy
considerations are:
(1) a strong public policy favors encouraging improvements to
enhance public safety, (2) subsequent remedial measures are not
considered sufficiently probative of prior negligence, because later
carefulness may simply be an attempt to exercise the highest
standard of care, and (3) a general concern that a jury may view such
conduct as an admission of negligence.62

Subsequent remedial measures jurisprudence is laced with
lengthy policy discussions63 because social policy underpins the
exclusion of subsequent remedial measures evidence.64 In 1890, the
Illinois Supreme Court in Hodges v. Percival laid the foundation for
using policy to exclude subsequent remedial measures.65 In Hodges,
plaintiffs filed suit after an elevator malfunctioned and plummeted,
causing catastrophic injuries to the elevator riders.66 The elevator
riders introduced expert testimony to establish that an “air cushion”
at the bottom of the shaft was commonly used to prevent injury in
the event of an elevator fall.67 The expert revealed that defendants
implemented the commonly used air cushion only after the elevator
riders were injured.68 The Illinois Supreme Court in Hodges decided
this evidence should have been excluded during trial.69 The court
explained:
Evidence of precautions taken after an accident is apt to be

407 to exclude remedial measures taken both before and after an injury).
60. Boyko & Vacca, supra note 3, at 658; see also Slough, supra note 2, at
705 (intertwining an analysis of subsequent remedial measures with three
notable exceptions to admissibility).
61. Boyko & Vacca, supra note 3, at 658.
62. Herzog, 657 N.E.2d at 932 (citing Schaffner v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co.,
541 N.E.2d 643, 647-48 (Ill. 1989) (declining to approve the admission of
subsequent remedial measures on railroad even though admission was
harmless)) (internal quotations omitted).
63. For an excellent example of a lengthy policy discussion, see Jablonski,
923 N.E.2d at 385.
64. Boyko & Vacca, supra note 3, at 658.
65. Hodges v. Percival, 23 N.E. 423 (Ill. 1890) (holding evidence of postaccident repairs should be excluded to promote defendants remedying
dangerous conditions).
66. Id. at 424.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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interpreted by a jury as an admission of negligence. The question of
negligence should be determined by what occurred before and at the
time of the accident, and not by what is done after it . . . Persons, to
whose negligence accidents may be attributed, will hesitate about
adopting such changes as will prevent the recurrence of similar
accident, if they are thereby to be charged with an admission of their
responsibility for the past.70

The court in Hodges argued like most modern courts.71 The
court contended that allowing evidence of subsequent repairs or
improvements would only deter defendants from fixing a dangerous
problem.72
In the simplest terms, courts like Hodges motivate individuals
to “take, or at least not discourage them from taking, steps in
furtherance of added safety.”73 This deterrence policy has also been
articulated as “encourag[ing] manufacturers to develop safer
products without a fear of liability for past acts.”74 From a premise
liability standpoint, “[i]f the evidence of the repair is allowed into
evidence to show that the landowner was negligent in causing the
fall, then no one would ever fix property that was dangerous.”75 This
policy justification has been widely criticized nationally because
some argue the policy shelters negligence rather than informs
citizens about defects.76 It appears that courts work to prevent fear
of liability among manufacturers, without an equal safeguard to
ensure defendant accountability.

70. Id.
71. See Herzog, 657 N.E.2d at 932 (noting, “[t]hird is a general concern that
a jury may view [subsequent remedial measures] as an admission of
negligence”) (citing Hodges, 23 N.E.2d at 423).
72. Hodges, 23 N.E.2d at 424.
73. FED. R. EVID. 407 (1975) (repealed 2011).
74. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 386.
75. Evidence of Repairs After Slip-and-Fall Accidents in Illinois, LAW
OFFICES OF BARRY G. DOYLE, P.C., www.accidentlawillinois.com/
library/repairs-after-slipandfall-accidents-in-illinois/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2018)
(explaining anecdotally to potential clients the reasoning for subsequent
remedial measures evidence exclusion).
76. See e.g., D.L. v. Huebner, 329 N.W.2d 890, 902 (Wis. 1983) (criticizing
the policy underlying exclusion of subsequent remedial measures because there
is no evidence that defendants will work to correct defects and we must not
expose public to similar injuries). Once again, Jablonski presents an interesting
discussion on the matter from an Illinois standpoint. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at
385. Although Jablonski will be thoroughly dissected in the Analysis section,
the court criticizes the policies underlying exclusion and states “we believe that
policy is better advanced by requiring manufacturers to inform consumers of
safety measures which will remedy defects that already exist in products.” Id.
at 386. In addition, the Jablonski court’s view was “manufacturers are more
likely to develop safer products if they are held accountable, on a continuing
basis, for a failure to warn of hazards that they knew or should have known
existed at the time the product was manufactured.” Id.
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Present Standstill of Admissibility

With this preliminary understanding of subsequent remedial
measures, the analysis of this comment cogitates the conflicting
decisions of Illinois appellate courts leading up to, and continuing
after, the seminal case Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co.77 The
inconsistencies surrounding subsequent remedial measures
exceptions and policies came to a head in 2011, when Illinois
attempted to codify a subsequent remedial measures rule.78 In
anticipation of a codified rule, the Illinois Bar Association wrote
“[b]efore codification, the rules of evidence in Illinois were dispersed
throughout case law—that is, they were contained in the findings
and rulings by the Illinois Supreme Court and the appellate courts;
statutes; and other Illinois Supreme Court rules.”79 With the
intention to simplify evidentiary practice across the state, the
advisory committee presented the following draft of a subsequent
remedial measures rule:
When, (1) after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, or (2)
after manufacture of a product but prior to an injury or harm
allegedly caused by that product, measures are taken that, if taken
previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur,
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a
product’s design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does
not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or
feasibility of precautionary measures or design, if controverted, or for
purposes of impeachment.80

The draft, however, never came to fruition.81 Illinois Rule of
Evidence 407 stands reserved to this day.82 This rule remains
stalled because the Illinois appellate court decisions vary so greatly,
especially in products liability cases.83 Illinois stands in a place
where “unless the [Illinois] supreme court decides to codify a rule
on its own, the conflict that now exists on this issue will await

77. Chris Bonjean, Supreme Court Approves Illinois Rules of Evidence, ILL.
ST. B. ASS’N (Sept. 27, 2010), www.isba.org/iln/2010/09/27/supreme-courtapproves-illinois-rules-of-evidence.
78. Gino L. DiVito, The Illinois Rules of Evidence: A Color-Coded Guide
Containing the New Rules, The Committee’s General and Specific Comments, A
Comparison with the Federal Rules of Evidence, And Additional Commentary,
TABET DIVITO & ROTHSTEIN, LLC, 89-91 (2020), tdrlawfirm.com/assets/
downloads/Illinois_Rules_of_Evidence_
Color-Coded_Guide.pdf.
79. Bonjean, supra note 77, at 1.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. ILL. R. EVID. 407.
83. See DiVito, supra note 78 (commenting on the line-up of conflicting cases
leading up to Jablonski).
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resolution until a case in controversy is submitted to it.”84 This
implicates the issue of this comment, which examines the appellate
court split that occurred in Jablonski v. Ford Motor Company and
proposes a resolution to the hindered progress of Illinois rules of
evidence.
III. ANALYSIS
The reservation of Illinois Rule of Evidence 407 and the
appellate courts split did not develop overnight. Going back in time
allows for a more accurate interpretation of Jablonski’s holding.85
This comment’s analysis begins with Illinois’ first seminal case on
the issue of subsequent remedial measures: Hodges v. Percival.86
Building upon this foundation, this analysis progresses to the
seminal cases partially abrogated by Jablonski.87 This analysis then
dissects and investigates the court’s holding in Jablonski.88
Jablonski not only re-wrote the timeline for admission of
subsequent remedial measures, but also completely inverted the
policy considerations used to exclude subsequent remedial
measures.89 Finally, this analysis examines Jablonski’s effect on the
admissibility of subsequent remedial measures.90
84. Id.
85. See Graham, supra note 37, at 338 (starting with the Hodges case to
illustrate case law on subsequent remedial measures).
86. Hodges, 23 N.E.2d at 424.
87. See Davis, 521 N.E.2d at 1284 (affirming the exclusion of subsequent
design changes because this evidence should only be admitted to prove a
feasible alternative design in products liability cases); Smith v. Black & Decker,
650 N.E.2d 1108 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (excluding post-manufacture but preinjury
repairs unless to prove an alternative feasible design in products liability cases).
88. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 355.
89. For an interesting case and example of the policy Jablonski flipped, see
Schaffner, 541 N.E.2d at 645 (affirming the exclusion of post-injury repairs
because there was no dispute as to control or feasibility). As an aside, if there
was more dispute over the admission of subsequent remedial measures in this
case, the facts of Schaffner could be utilized in numerous civil suits for case
illustrations. In Schaffner, a young boy was severely injured and permanently
disabled when he was crossing train tracks and his bike tire popped off. Id. at
645. The parents sued the City for failing to maintain a level crossing as well as
the bike manufacturer for the defect in the bike wheel. Id. at 646. Therefore,
Schaffner presents a products liability, negligence, and willful and wanton case
wrapped into one. Id. Unfortunately for this comment, the issue of subsequent
remedial measures evidence was easy to decide. The Court appropriately
excluded evidence of the defendant City’s post-injury crossing repair because
there was no dispute as to control or feasibility. Id. at 649. In other words, the
key feature necessary to admit the evidence- a dispute- was lacking, so the
evidence could not be admitted. Id. If there was dispute and the court provided
a more in-depth analysis of the subsequent remedial measures evidence,
Schaffner could potentially be the case to draft a rule from based on the versatile
nature of Schaffner’s facts and issues.
90. See Willis R. Tribler & Stephen S. Weiss, Illinois Civil Trial Evidence,
ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., 2-47 (2009), www.iicle.com (skirting
around the holding in Jablonski and advising practicing attorneys of the
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A. Seminal Cases Leading to Jablonski
In 1890, Illinois set the precedent for subsequent remedial
measures analyses in Hodges v. Percival.91 Examining the past is
not a mundane exercise for this analysis, as Jablonski relied heavily
on Hodges in 2010 to change Illinois’ evidentiary precedent.92
Hodges not only laid the foundation for a policy that encourages
deterrence, but also set forth a few very important rules. First and
foremost, Hodges established that “[t]he question of negligence
should be determined by what occurred before and at the time of
the accident, and not by what is done after it.”93 With this, the court
in Hodges outlined that the time period in which repairs were made
is a relevant fact that determines the admissibility of subsequent
remedial measures.94 According to Hodges, courts should look to
what the defendant was capable of doing before and at the time of
the accident, not look to what was fixed after the accident because
this is improper.95 Therefore, the court in Hodges articulated that
the “subsequent” element is exactly what limits admissibility of
remedial measures.96
This analysis of the relevant time period is essential to the
conflict in present-day Illinois. 97 The relevant time period set forth
in Hodges has greatly evolved over the past 100 years. For example,
in Davis v. International Harvester Co., the court applied the same
policy in Hodges, but changed the scope of the time period for
admissibility.98 In Davis, plaintiff was injured during a tractor
collision.99 The tractor driver brought suit against the tractor
manufacturer because a weak spot in the tractor’s body dislodged
and pierced the driver’s leg.100 The tractor driver appealed the jury’s
ultimate verdict in favor of the manufacturer and argued that the
trial court erred in excluding evidence of the tractor’s subsequent
design change.101 The court discussed the feasibility exception of
holdings in Schaffner and Herzog).
91. Hodges, 23 N.E.2d at 424.
92. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 385 (explaining “Hodges demonstrates that the
rule barring postaccident remedial measures was never intended to apply to
preinjury remedial measures. As early as 1890, the supreme court allowed
evidence of what occurred ‘before and at the time of the accident[.]’”).
93. Hodges, 23 N.E.2d at 424.
94. See generally Graham, supra note 37 (explaining the variations in time
periods of admissibility throughout Illinois seminal cases).
95. Hodges, 23 N.E.2d at 424.
96. Id. Although the court does not explicitly use the word subsequent, they
are ordering that the jury should only consider what happens before and during
the accident when making their decision. Id.
97. See Graham, supra note 37, at 340 (stating “[b]oth propositions [of the
relevant time period], however, are disputed”).
98. Davis, 521 N.E.2d at 1287-88.
99. Id. at 1284.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1286.
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subsequent remedial measures, but ultimately adopted what the
Davis court called “the narrower view.”102 This “narrower view”
engaged more recent cases that were generally allowing subsequent
remedial measures evidence in strict liability cases whenever a
post-accident change occurred.103 The court in Davis did not approve
of this sweeping admissibility, and rejected a ruling that would
continue to allow the general admission of remedial evidence.104
Instead, the Davis court excluded the subsequent design change
because “we find evidence of a post-occurrence change to be
admissible to prove only that an alternative design was feasible.”105
The court in Davis attempted to carve out a rule for products
liability cases by allowing evidence of post-accident fixes but only to
prove an alternative design was feasible before the injury.106 In
some ways Davis tried to clarify how narrow the feasibility
exception was supposed to be, as that exception had been slowly
expanding.107 Although the Davis court labelled its ruling the
“narrower view,” their decision still shifted the focus from the
preinjury phase noted in Hodges, to a post-accident stage.108 This
shift to focusing on the post-accident stage cracked the door that
Jablonski would eventually knock off the hinges.
Although Davis’ shift from preinjury to post-accident caused
ripples that greatly affected Illinois jurisprudence, the Davis case
provided the “preferred position” for many years.109 Davis
eventually influenced the holding in another seminal case: Smith v.
Black & Decker. Smith is an important case because it eventually
went head-to-head with Jablonski.110 It presented similar facts to
both Davis and Jablonski. The case involved the feasibility of a
tool’s alternative design after a man nearly amputated his hand
using the defendant-manufacturer’s saw.111 As mentioned, Davis

102. Id. at 1287-88 (deciding “we therefore recognize only the narrower
view[.]”). The court finds this “narrower view” in Sutkowski v. Universal Marion
Corp. Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp. 281 N.E.2d 749 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
103. See Burke v. Ill. Power Co., 373 N.E.2d 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (holding
evidence of post-occurrence changes are generally admissible in strict liability
cases).
104. Davis, 521 N.E.2d at 1287-88.
105. Id. at 1288 (emphasis added).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 1287 (opining “[t]he Sutkowski holding was either misconstrued
or summarily expanded by the Appellate Court for the First District in Burke v.
Illinois Power Co. to make evidence of post-occurrence changes generally
admissible in strict liability actions”) (internal citations omitted).
108. Id.
109. Graham, supra note 37, at 340 (explaining “[Davis] states the preferred
position of applying the doctrine of subsequent remedial measures to postoccurrence changes in products liability actions.”).
110. See Smith, 650 N.E.2d at 1113 (finding “we note, however, as the court
did in Davis, that the Illinois rule in this regard is comparable to Rule 407 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence”).
111. Id. at 1110-11.
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implemented a narrow rule that allowed evidence of post-accident
remedial measures in products liability cases.112 Smith differed
from Davis, however, as the Smith case involved the “postmanufacture, but preinjury” time period rather than merely the
post-accident stage.113 In Smith, the injured party sought to
introduce evidence that after the saw was manufactured but before
plaintiff’s injury, new standards required the implementation of a
blade guard to prevent injury.114 This blade guard would have
prevented the injured man’s severe hand injury.115 The focus on this
particular time period signified a key departure from Davis because
there was no argument of preventability in Davis. Therefore, Smith
revolved around more than a feasible alternative design like Davis.
Smith revolved around a safety feature that was not only feasible,
but also was required after the original and unsafe tool was already
in consumers’ hands.116 This set of facts is like failing to recall an
exploding seatbelt to prevent injury (Smith) versus fixing a
defective seatbelt after an injury occurs (Davis). Despite this key
distinction, the court in Smith simply applied Davis’ narrower view
relating to post-accident changes.117 Using this narrower view, the
court in Smith ultimately excluded the preinjury safety
requirement, and post-injury fixes to the tool.118
Hodges, Davis, and Smith illustrate the conflicting rules and
applications leading to Jablonski. In Hodges, the court excluded
evidence that did not occur before or during the time period when
the injury occurred.119 In Davis, the court decided that evidence of
post-injury fixes were admissible only to show feasibility of an
alternative design in products liability cases.120 Then, Smith
applied Davis’ to post-manufacture but preinjury fixes.121 In
summation, before Jablonski, Illinois jurisprudence had three

112. Davis, 521 N.E.2d at 1288.
113. Smith, 650 N.E.2d at 1113 (considering “we are now asked to determine
whether the exclusion of post-manufacture, but preinjury safety modifications
for purposes other than evidence of feasibility of alternative design . . . should
be apply to product liability actions as well as negligence actions”)(emphasis
added).
114. Id. at 1111-12.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1113.
118. Id. at 1113-14.
119. Hodges, 23 N.E.2d at 424 (holding, “[t]he question of negligence should
be determined by what occurred before and at the time of the accident and not
by what is done after it”).
120. Davis, 521 N.E.2d at 1288 (reiterating, “[a]s stated above, however, we
find evidence of post-occurrence change to be admissible to prove only that an
alternative design was feasible”).
121. Smith, 650 N.E.2d at 1113 (holding, “we find the same policy
consideration, i.e. the potential chilling effect on safety improvements, present
in product liability actions as in negligence actions regardless of whether the
modifications were preinjury or post-injury”).
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different rules for three different time periods of when the
subsequent remedial measures occurred (Figure A). This meant
when a products liability case arose and feasibility of an alternative
design was argued, the Illinois courts faced severe inconsistencies.
Figure A
While wading through this conflicting case law, Illinois then attempted to codify
Illinois Rule of Evidence 407 in 2011.122 Notice the proposed draft attempted to
incorporate these decisions by splitting the rule into two relevant time periods: “(1)
after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, or (2) after manufacture of a
product but prior to an injury . . . evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible[.]”123 The draft appears to engage Davis’ post-accident time period in part
(1) and then Smith’s post-manufacture, but pre injury time period in part (2). To its
credit, the rule attempts to follow the rulings in Davis and Smith, but the Jablonski
court had more to say on the issue. Thus, the codification failed, and the rule was
reserved pending the litigation in Jablonski.124 The question now is: does Jablonski
help or hinder this evidentiary issue?

B. Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co.: The Controversy
Continues
Jablonski appeared on the docket at a time when inconsistency
reigned over Illinois jurisprudence on the issue of subsequent
remedial measures and products liability cases. Jablonski,
however, did more than just interpret or change the scope of the
law.125 Jablonski engaged and protested against the current
precedent.126 The almost codified rulings from Davis and Smith
were called into question. In Jablonski v. Ford Motor Company, the
122. DiVito, supra note 78, at 90.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 355.
126. Id.
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Jablonski couple was driving their 1993 Lincoln Town car, when
they were rear-ended and a wrench in their trunk punctured the
rear-axel fuel tank causing a large fire.127 The accident trapped the
Jablonskis in the car, which caused the wife to suffer extreme burns
and the husband to die.128 The Jablonskis sued the manufacturer of
the 1993 Lincoln, Ford Motor Company (“Ford”).129 An array of
issues were raised on appeal in Jablonski, but for the purposes of
this analysis, this discussion will focus only on the court’s ruling
regarding subsequent remedial measures.130
Discovery revealed that post-manufacture, but preinjury, Ford
made many changes to their automobile models to prevent similar
accidents with fuel tank fires.131 First, by 1991, most Fordmanufactured vehicles had fuel tanks located in safer locations.132
Next, two years before the Jablonskis’ accident, Ford distributed
Trunk Packs only for police vehicles (with the same defects as the
Jablonskis’ car) to prevent impact-related fuel tank fires.133
Essentially, the Trunk Packs provided protection from the rear-axel
fuel tank and limited the danger to police officers in collisions.134
Ford never notified civilians of any rear-axel fires, or that Trunk
Packs were available to prevent rear-axel fuel tank fires.135 Finally,
evidence revealed that as early as 1960, Ford knew that real-axel
fuel tanks posed a danger in rear-end collisions.136 This damning
evidence implicated the issue on appeal as to whether the postmanufacture but preinjury remedial measures were admissible
under the feasibility exception. These pieces demonstrated that an
alternative design was not only feasible but was actually being
implemented in other Ford models while citizens like the Jablonskis
drove the unprotected models.137 This triggered the Smith court’s
ruling, which applied the Davis narrow rule.138 Therefore, according
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. The Jablonski appellate decision is a long 41 pages. The other issues
the court decided included “Claim of Negligent Location of Fuel Tank, Failure
to Guard, and Failure to Warn,” and “Failure to Inform of Trunk Pack and
Truck Pack Recommendations Claims.” Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 367. The court
also ruled on other evidentiary issues such as “Prior Similar Incidents” and the
“2006 Federal Safety Standards.” Id. at 386-87. Finally, the court also analyzed
issues of Jury Instructions and Special Interrogatories, and Punitive Damages.
Id. at 389-93.
131. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 356-57.
132. Id. at 357 (explaining “[b]y 1991, a majority of all the new automobiles
manufactured had fuel tanks forward of the axel”).
133. Id. at 363-64 (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 361 (mentioning “[c]ivilian owners of Panther platform vehicles,
including the Jablonskis, received no notice of the availability of the Upgrade
Kit, Trunk Pack, or Trunk Packing Considerations”).
136. Id. at 371.
137. Id. at 383.
138. Smith, 650 N.E.2d at 1113-14.
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to the standard rules, the Jablonskis’ evidence would only be
admissible to prove the feasibility of an alternative design. The
Jablonskis then argued that since Ford disputed feasibility of an
alternative design, this allowed the remedial measures evidence at
trial.139
The court used the overwhelming evidence presented by the
Jablonskis as a leg to stand on for its position.140 Before explaining
the court’s position, it is important to note that the Jablonski
appellate court did not discuss the issue of whether or not feasibility
was disputed.141 Even though disputed feasibility is required to
apply any of the subsequent remedial measures exceptions, the
Jablonski court did not discuss this issue. Instead, the court in
Jablonski commented on the overwhelming evidence presented by
the Jablonskis:
Thus, it seems clear that this evidence was at least admissible
to show that an alternative feasible design was available at
the time the 1993 Lincoln Town car left Ford’s control and that
it could have prevented the Jablonskis’ injuries. On this basis
alone, we believe that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the introduction of this evidence.142
This avoidance of a discussion about whether feasibility was
disputed is erroneous. The precedent for subsequent remedial
measures evidence does not examine the amount or quality of
evidence plaintiff brings, but rather only focuses on what is in
dispute.143 Therefore, it is essential to preface the court’s position
with a potential counterargument that courts should disregard the
ruling in Jablonski, because it erroneously applies the feasibility
exception. Rather than engage the parties’ arguments on disputed
feasibility, however, the court relied on Ford’s potential ability to
prevent the Jablonskis’ injuries as sufficient to allow the
evidence.144 This completely controverted the long-standing rule
that a court may only admit the evidence if feasibility is disputed.145
In regard to what the court did do, in Jablonski, it partially
abrogated the holding in Smith v. Black & Decker. The court made
a serious move and argued that courts should remember back to
Hodges v. Percival when courts emphasized “what occurred before
139. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 383.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 383-84.
142. Id. at 383 (emphasis added).
143. See e.g., Smith, 650 N.E.2d at 1114 (glazing over evidence of blade
guard implementation and stating the injured man should have made an offer
of proof on the issue).
144. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 384.
145. See Schaffner, 541 N.E.2d at 649 (stating, “[n]or do we believe that the
evidence presented here of the subsequent replacement of the Central Avenue
railroad crossing may be justified on either of the other grounds suggested by
the plaintiff. [Defendant] did not dispute that replacement of the crossing was
feasible”).
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and at the time of the accident” as the relevant time period for
remedial measures.146 Therefore, Jablonski rejected that postmanufacture but preinjury changes are admissible only to prove
feasibility of an alternative design.147 The court opined that the
policy that excludes subsequent remedial measures evidence should
be flipped.148 The court decided the long-standing deterrence policy
“does not apply to measures of which the defendant was aware and
could have implemented before the accident.”149 Instead, the court
in Jablonski held “we decline to follow [cases like Smith and
Davis]150 on this issue, because we do not agree that the same policy
considerations that bar the admission of postaccident remedial
measures apply equally to preinjury, postsale safety measures.”151
With this, the Jablonski court suggested three things: (1)
Illinois should shift its focus back to the preinjury phase like
Hodges, (2) different policy should prevail with preinjury remedial
measures, and (3) new policy should be implemented by courts to
inform consumers when safety measures are available to remedy a
potentially dangerous condition.152 In summation, the court shifted
the relevant time period back to the preinjury time period. To
substantiate its position, the court in Jablonski boldly asserted “[i]n
our view, manufacturers are more likely to develop safer products
if they are held accountable, on a continuing basis, for a failure to
warn of hazards they knew or should have known existed at the
time the product was manufactured.”153 Consequentially, the court
in Jablonski rejected the policy to encourage safety measures by
censoring evidence of a manufacturer’s repairs.154 Instead,
Jablonski proposed a new underlying policy: hold manufacturers
accountable, which will motivate manufacturers to cure dangerous
conditions.155

146. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 384 (declaring, “we quote the supreme court’s
[in Hodges] opinion at length because its analysis applies with equal force
today”).
147. Id. at 384.
148. Id. at 385.
149. Id.
150. The original text refers to the case Carrizales v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 589
N.E.2d 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (applying Davis and Schaffner to exclude
evidence of subsequent remedial measures); see also William G. Beatty, The
Illinois Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit of Appeals Examine the “RiskUtility” and “Consumer Expectation” Tests in Design Defect Cases, IDC
QUARTERLY 22, 1 (2012) (mentioning the Jablonski court’s decision to not follow
Carrizales). Carrizales case cites to Davis and Schaffner, but is most pertinent
to this analysis because Smith relied on Carrizales. Therefore, when Jablonski
abrogates Carrizales, the court also abrogates Smith v. Black & Decker.
151. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 385 (emphasis in the original).
152. Id. at 385-86.
153. Id. at 386.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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The holding in Jablonski directly contravenes Davis’ and Smith’s
“preferred position.”156 (Figure B) Jablonski rejected a narrower
view of the feasibility exception and rejected its application to only
post-occurrence and/or, preinjury, but post-manufacture repairs.157
Figure B
The parties in Jablonski appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court,158 but the Illinois
Supreme Court’s opinion did not clarify the questions posed in the appellate
Jablonski decision.159 Therefore, the move to reserve Illinois Rule of Evidence 407
while awaiting the outcome of Jablonski was in vain, as the litigation only left more
questions without answers.160

156. See Graham, supra note 37, at 340 (comparing the holdings in Davis
and Jablonski to illustrate conflicting positions in Illinois law).
157. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 385-86.
158. The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision can be found at Jablonski v. Ford
Motor Co., 955 N.E.2d 1138 (Ill. 2011).
159. See DiVito, supra note 78 at 90 (explaining that “the Supreme Court
based its decision on the insufficiency of plaintiffs’ evidence related to negligent
design, the plaintiffs’ reliance on a non-cognizable postsale duty to warn, and
the plaintiffs’ faulty theory concerning the defendant’s alleged voluntary
undertaking. The court therefore explicitly found it unnecessary to address
various evidentiary rulings, ‘including whether the trial court erred in
admitting evidence related to postsale remedial measures’”).
160. Id. (explaining, “[a]fter learning of the conflict caused by the Jablonski
holding and after the supreme court granted review in that case, however, the
Committee with drew its draft proposal, expecting the supreme court to address
and resolve the conflicts”).

2020]

“Sufficiently in Conflict”

423

C. Implications of Jablonski
To date, there has been no judicial clarification of Jablonski or
its abrogations.161 There also has not been a significant case that
requires a products liability/subsequent remedial measures
analysis.162 As of 2019, Illinois still stands in conflict. Luckily, cases
that implicate the other exceptions appear to be applying consistent
rules.163 An analysis that involves evidence of subsequent remedial
measures under the feasibility exception, however, omits
Jablonski’s precedent.164 Therefore, Illinois needs a case that
addresses the holdings in Hodges, Davis, Smith, and Jablonski and
either reconciles their differences or chooses the correct analysis for
subsequent remedial measures.

IV.

PROPOSAL

This comment shows how subsequent remedial measures
evidence appears in a variety of contexts. Unfortunately, this only
adds more inconsistency to the issue. Therefore, this proposal first
agrees with the well-settled application of the other two exceptions.
Then, combining the holdings in Davis, Smith, and Jablonski, this
comment sets forth a balancing test for cases that involve remedial
measures made in the post-manufacture, but preinjury time period.
Finally, this proposal discusses the public policy dispute and its
application to the proposed balancing test.
Although the bulk of the analysis section revolves around the
feasibility exception, the control and impeachment exceptions still
appear in Illinois law. With regard to these two exceptions, the
Herzog v. Lexington Township Illinois Supreme Court case provides
the rules most widely accepted by Illinois courts.165 For the
161. When shepardizing the Jablonski case on LexisNexis, there are no
subsequent cases that cite to Jablonski’s holding and address this issue of preinjury, but post-manufacture subsequent remedial measures.
162. There are no recent results for cases on LexisNexis when searching
“products liability” + “subsequent remedial measures” that would engage the
issues presented in Jablonski.
163. See e.g., Carney v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 77 N.E.3d 1 (Ill. 2016) (rejecting
admission of subsequent remedial measures evidence under the control
exception because there was no dispute that defendant did not have control over
the railroad bridge); see also Garcia v. Goetz, 121 N.E.3d 950 (Ill App. Ct. 2018)
(rejecting admission of subsequent remedial measures evidence under the
control exception because there was no dispute of control or ownership).
164. See Tribler & Weiss, supra note 90 (mentioning Jablonski but relying
on prior Illinois precedent to explain exclusion of subsequent remedial
measures evidence). The Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education
(commonly known as IICLE) provides resources for practicing attorneys to use.
Id. With regard to the controversy presented in this analysis, these guides
either explain what happens in Jablonski and does not apply it, or they do not
mention Jablonski. Id.
165. Herzog, 657 N.E.2d at 933.
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impeachment exception, a defendant may only be impeached with
subsequent remedial measures evidence when they attempt to
make exaggerated claims, such as stating a product is “the safest
on the market.”166 Otherwise, if a party “opens the door” to
subsequent remedial measures evidence, they may be impeached as
well.167 For the control/ownership exception, Herzog cites to Schultz
v. Richie and Coshenet v. Holub for the general rule that subsequent
remedial measures are only admissible to establish control or
ownership , if said control or ownership is disputed.168 This 1995
Illinois Supreme Court case is still considered good law.169
Consequently, these two exceptions are simple to apply. Therefore,
these rules should begin the structure of the codified Illinois Rule of
Evidence 407.
With regard to the feasibility of an alternative design
exception, particularly in products liability cases, Illinois needs to
carve out specific rules. The two recurring and competing time
periods are (1) strictly post-accident, like the repairs in Davis,170
and (2) post-manufacture but preinjury repairs, discussed in Smith
and Jablonski.171 First, Davis was correct to exclude strictly postaccident repairs. The narrow rule that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is only admissible to prove the feasibility of an
alternative design, if disputed, aligns with long-standing policy and
precedent.172 Therefore, as to the post-accident time period, Illinois
should codify the narrow rule set forth in Davis as it is already
followed and understood by many courts.
The proposal for the second time period at issue is far more
intricate. Illinois courts should implement a balancing test using
the narrow rule in Davis and Smith, and the controversial holding
in Jablonski. For example, at a pre-trial hearing – in addition to
using the court’s discretion under Illinois Rule of Evidence 104,173
and the relevancy rules of Illinois Rules of Evidence 401 and
403174—a court should weigh admissibility of post-manufacture but
166. Id.
167. See Van Gelderen, 958 N.E.2d at 1040 (allowing subsequent remedial
measures evidence when defendant inaccurately testified that he did nothing to
remedy stairs after injury).
168. Schultz, 499 N.E.2d at 1073; Coshenet, 399 N.E.2d at 1024.
169. Herzog, 657 N.E.2d at 933.
170. Davis, 521 N.E.2d at 1288.
171. Smith, 650 N.E.2d at 1114; Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 385-86.
172. Davis, 521 N.E.2d at 1288.
173. ILL. R. EVID. 104(a) (reading “[q]uestions of Admissibility
Generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be
a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making
its determination, the court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those
with respect to privileges”).
174. Id. (stating “‘[r]elevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
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preinjury subsequent remedial measures. The proposed balancing
test would likely look close to the following: (1) whether the
availability of an alternative design was feasible at the time
the product left the manufacturer’s control,175 (2) whether
implementing the design could have prevented the injury,176
and (3) whether the evidence is necessary only to prove a
disputed feasible alternative design.177
Breaking this down, factors (1) and (2) engage the court’s
troubling evidentiary discoveries in Jablonski. If an alternative
design was available before the dangerous product reached
consumers, courts should have the discretion to allow a jury to hear
this evidence. Likewise, the jury should know whether a plaintiff’s
injury could have been prevented if a defendant disputes a feasible
alternative design. The counterargument to this aspect, would be
significant prejudice to defendants. Failing to prevent an injury
when they were capable of doing so would arguably be the nail in a
defendant-manufacturer’s coffin. These two factors, however, do not
contravene the long-standing deterrence policy set forth in Hodges.
These factors do not strike fear that a post-injury fix will be used
against a defendant. These two factors do not look at a defendant’s
post-injury acts, they instead look at preinjury failures. Therefore,
the first two factors can elicit evidence that may be more probative
than prejudicial.
Factor (3) forces a court to determine if the evidence would
truly be used for the narrow purposes of establishing feasibility as
the courts in Davis and Smith wanted. In other words, even if
substantial evidence exists that an injury was preventable, the
evidence must still fall within the parameters of subsequent
remedial measures law. This third factor provides courts a leg to
stand on if the evidence that the injury was preventable is weak.
Furthermore, factor (3) ties in the necessary element of dispute that
the court in Jablonski overlooked.
This test would solve a number of issues in Illinois
jurisprudence because it would allow courts to include or exclude
evidence that falls outside of the Davis court’s narrow scope. At the

evidence”); see also Id. (reading “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence”).
175. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 383 (reasoning “[t]hus, it seems clear that this
evidence was at least admissible to show that an alterative feasible design was
available at the time the 1993 Lincoln Town Car left Ford’s control and that it
could have prevented the Jablonskis’ injuries”).
176 Id. at 385 (finding “[t]he same concern does not apply to measures of
which the defendant was aware and could have implemented before the
accident”).
177. Davis, 521 N.E.2d at 1288 (holding “we find evidence of a postoccurrence change to be admissible to prove only that an alternative design was
feasible”).
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same time, if a court is presented with clear and overwhelming
evidence that a manufacturer could have prevented many injuries
and deaths, but failed to do so, then the court may use its discretion
to allow the evidence so long as feasibility is disputed. This
ultimately incorporates Jablonski’s holding but addresses the
counterargument that Jablonski should be thrown out for failing to
address whether feasibility was disputed. For example, if the
balancing test was utilized in Jablonski, the court may still express
its disdain for Ford’s failure to prevent the Jablonskis’ accident. The
court would then still need to address whether feasibility is
disputed and whether the evidence is offered only to prove a feasible
alternative design.178
A court’s analysis should not conclude here by applying only
the balancing test. Courts should still consider the policy that
underpins the exclusion of subsequent remedial measures.
Jablonski injected uncertainty into the previously well-settled
deterrence policy that emerged from Hodges v. Percival.179 Again,
this policy limited evidence of subsequent remedial measures so
that manufacturers were not deterred from fixing a dangerous
condition after an accident occurs. Before Jablonski, courts argued
that allowing subsequent remedial measures evidence would only
deter manufacturers from curing dangerous defects.180 Jablonski,
however, looked at the substantial evidence against Ford and
argued that manufacturers should be held accountable for blatantly
dismissing the opportunity to cure a dangerous defect.181 Personal

178. For cases to illustrate the balancing test, apply the interesting facts in
Schaffner. Schaffner, 541 N.E.2d at 645; Tribler & Weiss, supra note 90. As
mentioned, the court in Schaffner analyzed both the negligence claim and the
products liability claim, but the issue of subsequent remedial measures was
easy to decide because there was no feasibility dispute. If the facts of Schaffner
changed and a dispute existed, however, the balancing test would work in that
case too. If the City in Schaffner disputed the feasibility of a crossing repair
even though there were numerous pieces of evidence to the contrary, a court
could use this three-part balancing test. If the balancing test was applied the
court would likely find the evidence of a subsequent remedial crossing repair
admissible mainly because feasibility was disputed, but also based on the other
factors. The court could opine on the preventability of the boy’s injuries if the
City had just completed the crossing repair plans. Therefore, the balancing test
would work in a negligence claim such as the one in Schaffner too.
179. Hodges, 23 N.E.2d at 424.
180. See e.g. Davis, 521 N.E.2d at 1287 (finding “[t]he rationale for the rule
is that defendants should not be deterred from making repairs or modifications
which will increase safety by the concern that the plaintiff might use those
measures as evidence of past negligence”); see also Herzog, 657 N.E.2d at 932
(reasoning “a strong public policy favors encouraging improvements to enhance
public safety”).
181. Jablonski, 923 N.E.2d at 385-86 (declaring “while a manufacturer may
be hesitant to adopt postaccident remedial measures if those measures are
admissible as evidence to prove negligence in the case involving that accident,
other policy considerations prevail preinjury … In our view, manufacturers are
more likely to develop safer products if they are held accountable, on a
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injury attorneys, and most consumers for that matter, cannot ignore
that both policies serve essential purposes. Illinois courts should
consider both sides of the policy and use either to bolster their
evidentiary ruling to admit or exclude evidence of subsequent
remedial measures. With these dual policy considerations, both
plaintiffs and defense have a policy argument on their side. Then, a
judge may look at the individual facts of the case and use her
discretion to decide which policy approach better serves the public.
Therefore, the policy argument from pre-Jablonski or postJablonski may be used like a fourth factor in the balancing test
depending on disputed feasibility and preventability of injury.

V. CONCLUSION
In summary, what often matters in a case with subsequent
remedial measures evidence is not the rule, but the exceptions to
the rule. Although other jurisdictions and federal courts rely on
well-settled precedent to guide admissibility or exclusion, Illinois
rules regarding subsequent remedial measures stand obscured. The
state has managed to implement consistent rulings on two out of
the three exceptions, but the third exception—feasibility—is riddled
with confusion and error. Illinois courts should work to amalgamate
these rulings by implementing a three-part balancing test to guide
admissibility of subsequent remedial measures in the postmanufacture, but preinjury time period. This will allow courts the
discretion to hear evidence and form an educated, well-adjusted
decision about admissibility.
If there is one takeaway from this Comment, it should be that
Illinois needs to embrace the inconsistent precedent and reconcile
the conflicting cases. Opponents of the balancing test may argue
there is no federal equivalent to the proposed balancing test,182 but
the cloudy conditions of Illinois common law require a creative
solution. Rather than stand with a reserved evidentiary rule and
inconsistent case law, the Illinois Supreme Court should hear a
products liability subsequent remedial measures case and
implement a balancing test that touches upon the conflicting
precedent. Otherwise, products liability plaintiffs will continue to
spend hours at pre-trial hearings arguing they are lawfully entitled
to tell the jury about a car’s new design after numerous people died.
Medical malpractice attorneys will continue to argue the jury
continuing basis, for a failure to warn of hazards that they knew or should have
known existed at the time the product was manufactured”).
182. FED. R. EVID. 407. The federal rule, however, does begin by stating
“[w]hen measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or harm
less likely to occur . . .”; this does connect to the second factor of the proposed
balancing test. Id. Although the federal rule does not have a rule pertaining to
preventability, the text of the federal rule acknowledges that preventability
connects to subsequent remedial measures. Id.
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should hear about a medical instrument’s non-party manufacturer.
And in a garden-variety negligence case, plaintiff-tenant and
defendant-owner will continue to argue about telling the jury about
the owner’s slippery stair repair. Illinois cases will go on, and
without one codified and consistent rule, so will the arguments
without clear answers. Therefore, it is time to create one rule to
govern admissibility of subsequent remedial measures.

